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Internet Search and Seizure in United States v. Forrester: 
New Problems in the New Age of Pen Registers 
 
 I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
Katherine Kressman Taylor‘s well-known short story, ―Address 
Unknown,‖ depicts two business associates and friends who are 
corresponding through letters.
1
 Max is a Jew living in America and 
conducting their shared business venture of selling artwork. The other 
correspondent, Martin, lives in Nazi Germany and sympathizes with the 
Nazi cause. Max becomes hostile after Martin refuses to hide Max‘s 
younger sister Griselle from Nazi troops, and she is killed.
2
 In retaliation, 
Max starts writing strange codes in his letters to Martin that appear as 
numbers and names of paintings. The codes look highly suspicious and 
are designed to make it appear as if Martin is a member of an 
underground movement smuggling Jews out of the country. Martin 
responds with confusion and asks Max to stop writing him the strange 
letters because his mail is being monitored by the Nazi regime.
3
 The 
letters continue, becoming more frequent and extreme. Martin writes 
back infuriated. He tells Max that he has no anti-Nazi sentiments and 
feels that Max is trying to sabotage him. The story ends with a returned 
letter from Max stamped ―addressee unknown,‖ implying that Martin had 
been captured by the Nazi regime.
4
 
Taylor‘s story is a depiction of the Nazi government‘s control over 
civilian communication during its years of European domination. Other 
governments have had similar authority to confiscate and search the 
public‘s mail and other communication at will. The Framers of the 
United States Constitution contemplated the danger of infringement of 
freedom presented by governments with unbridled control over citizen 
property and communication. The Framers wrote the Fourth Amendment 
to protect the people against these abuses of government power and to 
safeguard certain liberties: 
 
 
 1. Katherine Kressman Taylor, Address Unknown, in THE ELOQUENT SHORT STORY 232 
(Lucy Rosenthal ed., 2004). 
 2. Id. at 250–51. 
 3. Id. at 252–55. 
 4. Id. at 256. 
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 
Although the example of government control in Taylor‘s story is an 
extreme one, it illustrates the dangers of too much government 
interference—interference that must be checked. The fine line between 
public welfare and individual privacy has become much more attenuated 
as the country‘s tools for accessing communication and information have 
become more expansive. The innovation of the telephone and the 
Internet has required modern legislatures to draw a line where 
government control ends and individual privacy begins regarding 
communication sent through channels provided by private corporations. 
In 2008, United States v. Forrester presented a new question to the 
judiciary regarding the search and seizure of private communication: can 
law enforcement entities access IP numbers
5
 and email to and from 
addresses used by a private citizen without first proving probable cause?
6
 
While the Ninth Circuit answered in the affirmative,
7
 the Court‘s analysis 
raises questions about the rectitude of the government accessing 
channeling information in private communications. 
Part II of this case note discusses the use of pen registers and the 
history of their statutory regulation. Part III describes the facts of United 
States v. Forrester. Part IV outlines the Court‘s reasoning in that case. 
Part V discusses and argues against the Court‘s holding that channeling 
information falls outside a citizen‘s reasonable expectation of privacy.8 
Part VI disputes the Court‘s assertion that the seizure of IP and email 
to/from addresses does not violate a citizen‘s right to keep the contents of 
communications private. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5. IP numbers are ―[t]he numerical sequence that serves as an identifier for an Internet 
server. An IP address appears as a series of four groups of numbers separated by dots. The first 
group is a number between 1 and 255 and the other groups are a number between 0 and 255, such as 
192.135.174.1. Every server has its own unique address.‖ Dictionary.com, s.v. ―IP Address,‖ 
available at http://dictionary.reference.com /browse/IP%20Address (last visited Dec. 21, 2007). 
 6. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 7. Id. at 1050. 
 8. Id. at 1048. 
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 II.  PEN REGISTERS AND THE HISTORY OF THEIR REGULATION  
 
Pen registers record or decode ―dialing, routing, addressing, or 
signaling information‖9 transmitted through telecommunications carriers 
like telephone companies and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Pen 
registers were originally used to record the telephone numbers dialed to 
and from a particular phone.
10
 However, in 2001 the US Patriot Act 
broadened this definition to include devices that could track routing 
information over the Internet.
11
 
Statutes and case law have established protections against the seizure 
of telephone and Internet communications. Under 18 U.S.C.A. §2511, 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), it is illegal for 
employees of these telecommunications carriers to intercept and disclose 
any wire, oral, or electronics communications including routing 
information.
12
 However, telecommunications carriers are required to 
carry pen registers or similar technology that allow the interception of 
wire and electronic communications upon the issue of a court order.
13
 
In the past, government agents who applied for such a court order 
had to prove probable cause. In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court 
stated that search and seizure does not apply only to physical property. It 
can apply to other communications including communication transmitted 
through a telephone.
14
 Generally, probable cause is required in order to 
clear the constitutional bar for search and seizure.
15
 This standard was 
reflected in Title III, the Federal Wiretap Act, which set procedures for 
authorization of surveillance of oral, wire, and electronic 
communications.
16
 This Act required a showing of probable cause before 
 
 9. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing use of A Pen Register and Trap on 
(XXX) Internet Service Account/User Name, (xxxxxxxx@xxx.com), 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 47 (D. 
Mass. 2005) [hereinafter Pen Register Application] (A pen register is ―a device or process which 
records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an 
instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, 
however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication.‖); see also 47 
U.S.C.A. § 1002; 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3121–27. 
 10. Pen Register Application, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 47. 
 11. Id.; see also Deborah F. Buckman, Allowable Use of Federal Pen Register and Trap and 
Trace Device to Trace Cell Phones and Internet Use, 15 A.L.R. FED. 2d 537 (2006). 
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a) (―. . . a person or entity providing an electronic communication 
service to the public shall not intentionally divulge the contents of any communication . . . while in 
transmission on that service to any person or entity other than an addressee or intended recipient of 
such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient.‖). 
 13. 47 U.S.C.A. §1002 (a)(1)–(2). 
 14. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 15. 79 C.J.S. Searches § 58 (2008). 
 16. Electronic Privacy Information Center (Nov. 17, 2005), http://epic.org/privacy 
/terrorism/usapatriot/ [hereinafter EPIC]; see also Center for Democracy and Technology, 
Government Surveillance, The Nature and Scope of Governmental Electronic Surveillance Activity, 
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a court order was issued authorizing government surveillance.
17
 
However, the standard of ‗probable cause‘ was diminished by 
amendments effectuated by the US Patriot Act, which removed Title III 
and the ECPA‘s requirement of showing probable cause. Under the 
Patriot Act, the government only has to show that ―the information likely 
to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.‖18 This sudden easing of the government‘s burden 
of proof has caused a fair amount of criticism from civil liberties 
groups
19
 and even from some members of the legislature.
20
 
Under case law, communicative content known as ―routing 
information‖ has always been devoid of the requirement to prove 
probable cause. In Smith v. Maryland the United States Supreme Court 
found that traditional Fourth Amendment protections do not apply to 
telephone routing information (like telephone numbers) because of the 
caller‘s lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in those numbers and 
because this information does not constitute ―content.‖21 United States v. 
Forrester extended this reasoning to pen registers surveying the Internet. 
However, this extension poses problems because information collected 
by pen registers, including IP addresses and email to and from addresses, 
are qualitatively different than typical routing information. Internet users 
who use IP addresses and email to and from addresses have a higher 
expectation of privacy in that content than in telephone numbers. 
 
(July 2006), http://www.cdt.org/wiretap/wiretap_overview.html.  
 17. EPIC, supra note 16; see also Center for Democracy and Technology, Government 
Surveillance, The Nature and Scope of Governmental Electronic Surveillance Activity, (July 2006), 
http://www.cdt.org/wiretap/wiretap_overview.html. 
 18. US Patriot Act §216(a)(1)(2001). 
 19. The Electronic Privacy Information Center is one group who have actively opposed the 
US Patriot Act. Electronic Privacy Information Center website, http://epic.org/epic/about.html 
(―EPIC is a public interest research center in Washington, D.C. It was established in 1994 to focus 
public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and 
constitutional values.‖). 
The following comes from the EPIC website: 
 
The events of September 11 convinced . . . overwhelming majorities in Congress that law 
enforcement and national security officials need new legal tools to fight terrorism. But we 
should not forget what gave rise to the original opposition – many aspects of the bill 
increase the opportunity for law enforcement and the intelligence community to return to 
an era where they monitored and sometimes harassed individuals who were merely 
exercising their First Amendment rights. Nothing that occurred on September 11 
mandates that we return to such an era. 
 
EPIC, supra note 16 (quoting John Podesta, USA Patriot Act—The Good, the Bad, and the Sunset, 
29 HUM. RTS. MAG. 3, 4 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/winter02/podesta.html 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2008)). 
 20. EPIC, supra note 16. 
 21. Smith v Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
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Additionally, IP addresses and email to and from addresses and are more 
suggestive of content than telephone numbers. 
 
 III.  THE FACTS OF UNITED STATES V. FORRESTER  
 
The defendants in United States v. Forrester, Mr. Forrester and Mr. 
Alba, were convicted of conspiring to create an Ecstasy-manufacturing 
operation. Evidence introduced at trial showed that they created a large 
laboratory to be housed in an insulated sea-land container.
22
 Documents 
presented by the government showed that the laboratory would have 
created 440 kilograms of Ecstasy, which would produce an estimated 
profit of ten million dollars a month.
23
 Alba purchased chemicals for 
producing the Ecstasy and Forrester met with a Swedish chemist in 
Stockholm to learn how to produce the drug.
24
 
Government agents employed computer surveillance technologies, 
including a pen register
25
 and trap and trace devices,
26
 to track email and 
Internet activity of the defendants.
27
 The surveillance tools were 
employed through the defendant‘s Internet Service Provider (ISP), 
PacBell.
28
 The surveillance began after the Court authorized the 
investigators to install a pen register to Alba‘s account.29 The 
government was able to see the to/from addresses of those whom Alba 
emailed.
30
 The government was also able to access the IP addresses of 
Internet sites that Alba accessed.
31
 This provided the government with 
the home pages of the websites visited by Alba. An IP address is distinct 
from a URL
32
 because an IP address does not show the particular page of 
the website that the individual is accessing.
33
 The monitoring results 
 
 22. United States v. Forrester, 512 F. 3d 500, 506 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. For the definition of pen register, see supra note 9. 
 26. A ―trap and trace device . . . captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which 
identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing and signaling information 
reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided, however, 
that such information shall not include the contents of any communication.‖ Pen Register 
Application, 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 47 (D. Mass. 2005).  
 27. Forrester, 512 F.3d at 505. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Pen Register Application, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 47. 
 32. A URL means ―Uniform Resource Locator: a protocol for specifying addresses on the 
Internet,‖ Dictionary.com, s.v. ―URL,‖ http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/URL (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2008). It is ―an Internet address (for example, http://www.hmco.com/trade/), usually 
consisting of the access protocol (http), the domain name (www.hmco.com), and optionally the path 
to a file or resource residing on that server (trade).‖ Id. 
 33. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 at 510. 
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showed that Alba had sent several emails to Forrester and had accessed 
certain chemical websites.
34
 Based on these results and other pieces of 
evidence, Forrester and Alba were convicted of conspiracy to 
manufacture and distribute ecstasy.
35
 Alba appealed on the ground that 
the government‘s surveillance of his Internet activity violated his Fourth 
Amendment right against search and seizure.
36
 
 
 IV.  THE COURT‘S REASONING  
 
The Ninth Circuit held that government surveillance of IP addresses 
and email to and from addresses does not violate a private party‘s Forth 
Amendment rights.
37
 The Court found that individuals do not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in IP addresses and email to and from 
addresses. It also held that this is routing information, not content (which 
is protected under Supreme Court precedent). The Court cited the 
Supreme Court‘s reasoning in Smith v. Maryland to support its holding. 
 
 A.  The Court Holds IP Addresses and Email To and From Addresses 
Have No Expectation of Privacy  
 
Under the Fourth Amendment, an action does not constitute a search 
if there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.
38
 In Smith v. Maryland, 
the Supreme Court determined that the use of a pen register to track 
which phone numbers were dialed from a particular residence was not a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment because, upon turning this 
information over to a telephone company, an individual no longer has an 
―expectation of privacy.‖39 The Court reasoned that, ―a person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over 
to third parties.‖40 
The Court reasoned that individuals know that employees at phone 
companies have access to and must use channeling information such as 
telephone numbers to place phone calls. Individuals who use the phone, 
therefore, waive their right to privacy over that channeling information 
by freely handing it over to the telephone company.
41
 The Court in 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 506. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 513. 
 38. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983); Osburn v. State, 44 P.3d 523, 526 
(Nev. 2002). 
 39. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 751–52 (1979). 
 40. Id. at 743–44. 
 41. Id. at 742. 
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Forrester used the same reasoning to hold that individuals who use the 
Internet have no expectation of privacy because they freely relay IP 
addresses and email to and from addresses to ISPs to enable the ISP to 
run the information through the right servers in order to send email 
messages or access the website.
42
 
 
B.  The Court Holds IP Addresses and Email To and From Addresses 
Are Not Communicative Content  
 
The Court also cited the Supreme Court‘s comment that the use of 
pen registers without a warrant is constitutional because the registers 
cannot access the content of the communications.
43
 Under Supreme 
Court precedent in Katz v. United States, communicative content cannot 
be accessed by the government unless the government first obtains a 
warrant.
44
 The Court said that the government surveillance in this case 
was similar to that of Smith.
45
 In Smith, the Court found that telephone 
numbers are routing information and do not consist of the content of a 
communication and are, therefore, immune to the restrictions set in 
Katz.
46
 The Forrester Court found that email to and from addresses and 
IP addresses are analogous to telephone numbers because they are 
routing information and government officials accessing this information 
would be unable to view the content of the email messages or websites.
47
 
 
C.  The Outcome of Forrester  
 
Thus, the Forrester Court held that because there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in IP and email to and from addresses that are 
freely given to an ISP, and because pen registers do not enable the 
government to view the contents of the emails or websites, there was no 
search, and Fourth Amendment protections do not apply.
48
 Therefore, the 
evidence the government gathered through the pen register and presented 
at trial did not need to be suppressed.
49
 
 
 
 
 42. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509–10 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding there is a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the contents of a telephone conversation). 
 45. Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509. 
 46. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979). 
 47. Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509–10. 
 48. Id. at 510. 
 49. Id. 
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V.  DO INDIVIDUALS HAVE A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
IN IP ADDRESSES AND EMAIL TO AND FROM ADDRESSES?  
 
In order for information to be covered under the Fourth Amendment, 
a plaintiff must prove both that she had an expectation of privacy and 
that this expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.
50
 Although judicial precedent is somewhat limited in the area 
of Internet communications, the courts have held that certain types of 
Internet communications enjoy an expectancy of privacy while others do 
not. Before Forrester, no other circuit court had addressed the issue of IP 
addresses and email to and from addresses. However, there are strong 
policy reasons why this particular type of information should enjoy an 
expectancy of privacy. 
 
 A.  Historical Court Treatment of Internet Communications and the 
Reasonable Expectancy of Privacy  
 
In the area of Internet communications, courts have held that there 
are many types of communications that do have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. Courts have held that the content of email communications 
are protected because there is a reasonable expectation of privacy when 
those emails are stored with, or sent through, a commercial Internet 
Service Provider (ISP).
51
 The Court in United States v. Maxwell held that 
people sending and receiving real time messages, like instant messages, 
have a reasonable expectancy of privacy because once the message is 
sent it is lost forever.
52
 The Court analogized these real time messages to 
telephone conversations which are clearly covered by the Fourth 
Amendment.
53
 A confidentiality agreement provided by the ISP, while 
not guaranteeing a constitutional expectation of privacy, is strong 
evidence that the user had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
online communications.
54
 
On the other hand, courts have held there is not a reasonable 
expectation of privacy when an individual has accessed the Internet at 
the place of her employment.
55
  Also, there is no expectation of privacy 
on university computers or networks
56
 or on a city network without 
 
 50. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740; see also Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000). 
 51. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417–18 (C.A.A.F. 1996); see also Warshak v. 
United States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 52. Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 418. 
 53. Id. at 469–71. 
 54. Id. at 417. 
 55. See United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 56. See United States v. Butler, 151 F. Supp. 2d 82, 84 (D. Me. 2001) (holding that there was 
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password protection.
57
 Online bulletin boards
58
 and chat rooms
59
 also 
have no expectation of privacy. Subscriber information, account 
information, or other ―non-content‖ information conveyed to third parties 
are viewed as destroying the privacy expectation as well.
60
 
The courts have not articulated a test to determine what information 
enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy. Courts make this 
determination by looking at precedent and evaluating, on a case-by-case 
basis, common sense arguments to determine whether ―. . . an intrusion 
infringes upon constitutionally protected personal and societal values.‖61 
 
 B.  Individuals Do Have a Reasonable Expectancy of Privacy with 
Internet IP Addresses and Email Addresses  
 
United States v. Forrester is the first circuit court case to address 
whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy for 
channeling information such as email to and from addresses and IP 
addresses.
62
 The Court relied on Smith v. Maryland to hold that people 
do not have a subjective expectation for privacy when they willfully give 
information over to third parties such as telephone companies.
63
 
However, there is evidence that many people don‘t believe they are 
waiving their right to privacy when they transmit communications to 
third party corporations. The dissenting opinions in Smith make this 
assertion for telephone communications. Also, the common practice of 
users and Internet service providers suggests that there is an even greater 
expectation of privacy for Internet communications than for telephone 
communications. 
 
no legitimate expectation of privacy where a defendant downloaded child pornography using a 
university‘s Internet capacity and stored the pornography on the computer‘s hard drive). 
 57. See United States v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 58. See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 59. See United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1185 (S.D. Ohio 1997); 
Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 833 (Penn. 2001); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 
417 (C.A.A.F. 1996). 
 60. See United States v. D‘Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 120 (D. Mass. 2007); Freedman v. 
American Online Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 182–83 (D. Conn. 2005); United States v. Sherr, 400 F. 
Supp. 2d 843, 848 (D. Md. 2005); United States v. Cox, 190 F. Supp. 2d 330, 332 (N.D. N.Y. 2002); 
U.S. v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000);  United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. 
Supp.2d 504, 507 (W.D. Va 1999); In re Property of Forgione, 908 A.2d 593, 607 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
2006); House v. Com., 83 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 441–42 
(2003). 
 61. 79 C.J.S. Searches § 20 (updated Dec. 2007); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 
(1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); United States v. Hendrickson, 940 F.2d 320 
(8th Cir. 1991). 
 62. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 63. Id. at 509. 
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1.  The Smith dissenting opinions and their application to Internet 
communication 
 
The dissenting opinions in Smith suggest strong policy reasons for 
why communications handed to third parties should retain some 
expectation of privacy. These policy reasons support the assertion that 
Internet communications, including IP addresses and email to and from 
addresses, maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
In his dissenting opinion in Smith v. Maryland, Justice Marshall 
stated that even assuming that individuals know that phone company 
employees view the phone numbers they dial, ―it does not follow that 
they expect this information to be made available to the public in general 
or the government in particular. Privacy is not a discrete commodity, 
possessed absolutely or not at all.‖64 Citizens regularly entrust personal 
information to companies with the expectation that such information will 
be kept confidential. Justice Marshall continued, ―Those who disclose 
certain facts to a bank or a phone company for a limited business purpose 
need not assume that this information will be released to other persons 
for other purposes.‖65 
Similar reasoning applies in Internet transactions. Just because an 
individual hands sensitive information to a corporation, it does not 
follow that the individual loses the expectation that this information will 
be kept confidential. Credit card numbers, social security numbers, and 
medical histories are just a few examples of information given to online 
companies, accompanied by an expectation of privacy. Consumers 
realize that some corporations, such as banks, hospitals, and insurance 
companies, perform functions that consumers cannot perform for 
themselves. In these situations consumers must give their private 
information in order to receive these services. By sharing sensitive 
information with the institutions, consumers do not indicate a reduced 
expectation of privacy, but rather show trust in the corporation‘s 
assurances of confidentiality. 
Justice Marshall also criticized the Court‘s reasoning that an 
individual who conveys information to these third parties ―assumes the 
risk‖ of disclosure to the government.66 Justice Marshall stated that 
assuming risk implies that the parties making the communication have a 
choice.
67
 Individuals who place telephone calls don‘t have the option of 
placing a call that doesn‘t go through a telephone company. Therefore, 
 
 64. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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the only choice they have is either to make a call through a telephone 
company and open their communications to government surveillance or 
forgo making phone calls at all. This is an impracticable choice for, as 
Justice Marshall said, making telephone calls is ―a personal and 
professional necessity.‖68 
The Court in Forrester created the same dilemma identified by 
Justice Marshall in Smith. Under the Court‘s reasoning, users have to 
choose between refraining from Internet usage or submitting to 
government surveillance. In reality, this is not much of a choice. Like 
telephone calls, the Internet has become a personal and professional 
necessity. Few would, or arguably could, choose to forgo the benefits 
provided by the Internet even if they were aware that they may be 
watched. However, it is doubtful that individuals know they are opening 
themselves to government surveillance every time they log onto the 
Internet. Even assuming individuals were aware that their private 
communications could be monitored by the government, this does not 
mean individuals who use the Internet are consciously assuming a risk or 
waiving their expectation of privacy since, as Justice Marshall said, 
assuming risks requires a practicable choice.
69
 
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Brennan, also dissented from the 
Smith opinion. Stewart commented that the rationale used by the Smith 
majority has no sound application. He stated that an individual not only 
hands over telephone numbers to a company when making a call; the 
individual also gives the company access to their phone conversations.
70
 
Following the Court‘s line of reasoning—that anything handed to a third 
party is no longer expected to be private—the government should have 
access to the content of the individual‘s conversation as well: a position 
which squarely conflicts with the Fourth Amendment.
71
 
Stewart also cited Katz as holding that there is a greater expectation 
of privacy depending upon the context in which the communication was 
made. In Katz the Court stated that this expectation is greater if telephone 
calls are made from private areas such as a telephone booth, one‘s home, 
or one‘s office.72 Likewise, Internet communications are regularly made 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 746–47 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 71. Id.; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that there is a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the contents of a telephone conversation). 
 72. Id.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). The Court in Katz says, ―We have 
never suggested that this concept [of constitutionally protected areas] can serve as a talismanic 
solution to every Fourth Amendment problem.‖ However, in its reasoning the Court did regard the 
context as a pertinent consideration in determining whether there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
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from one‘s home or private office. The Court in Forrester declined to 
look at the objective circumstances surrounding the location of the 
defendant when he made Internet communications and whether the 
location would have suggested a greater expectation of privacy from the 
user. It is likely that, since the pen register was installed on Alba‘s 
personal PacBell account
73
, many of the Internet communications that 
the government surveyed were in Alba‘s home. The Court, however, 
chose to establish a standard that applies uniformly to all Internet 
communications, regardless of their context. 
These dissenting opinions present strong reasoning to rebut the 
ruling of the majority‘s opinion in Smith (that communications handed to 
third parties have no expectation of privacy). Likewise, these same 
policy reasons, as expressed by the dissent, support the notion that 
Internet communications, though given to third parties, should retain a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 
2.  Internet communication carries a stronger reasonable expectation of 
privacy than telephone communications. 
 
There are several differences between Internet communications and 
telephone communications that suggest that individuals have a greater 
expectation of privacy for their Internet communications. Many common 
practices of Internet Service Providers and Internet users suggest this 
greater expectation. 
One such practice is privacy agreements. Many corporations, and 
increasingly, online corporations, have privacy agreements assuring 
customers that they will keep their information confidential. This added 
assurance of security increases customer confidence, inducing many 
individuals to overcome the fear of making transactions with personal 
information released to the organizations. As acknowledged by the Court 
in U.S. v. Maxwell, a privacy agreement is an indication that an 
individual has a greater expectancy of privacy.
74
 
Additionally, legislation such as the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA)
75
 gives the public more reason to expect privacy 
when making a phone call or giving information over the Internet. The 
Act provides that employees working for communication services cannot 
obtain or divulge the contents of any communication.
76
 It also provides 
 
 73. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 74. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996). 
 75. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511. 
 76. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511 3(a) ( ―A person or entity providing an electronic communication 
service to the public shall not intentionally divulge the contents of any communication . . . while in 
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that such information can only be acquired by obtaining a court order or 
a warrant.
77
 This and other privacy legislation gives the public a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in regard to their Internet 
communications. 
The practice of sending billing and use records is another difference 
between phone companies and ISPs that suggest a higher expectation of 
privacy. Professor Steven M. Bellovin,
78
 professor of computer science 
at Columbia University, opined that the reasoning of the court in United 
States v. Forrester is far too broad.
79
 He comments that the applicability 
of pen registers to the Internet introduces several privacy problems that 
do not exist with telephone corporations—problems that the Court in 
Forrester does not address.
80
 
Bellovin remarks that customers of telephone corporations regularly 
receive telephone bills in the mail with a record of all of the telephone 
numbers dialed throughout the month.
81
 These bills put the customer on 
notice that the numbers are actually being recorded for corporate records. 
In fact, the notice provided by monthly bills is something that the Court 
in Smith identified as increasing the reasonable expectation of privacy.
82
 
An ISP, on the other hand, does not give its customers such a record, so 
the customer may be ignorant that such records exist. Bellovin believes 
that the public is generally unaware of how ISPs work and that many 
customers may believe that their routing information is kept far more 
private when submitted through an ISP than when dialed through a 
telephone corporation.
83
 Therefore, these individuals may have a 
heightened expectation of privacy when they use the Internet.
84
 
The Court in Forrester erred in presuming that the public has no 
expectation of privacy when it hands private information to corporations. 
Many consumers give confidential information to corporations with an 
understanding that the corporation will keep it from being accessed by 
private parties. This understanding is reflected in the ECPA. The Court 
also failed to account for the potential differences in the public‘s 
expectation of privacy for information given to telephone companies as 
 
transmission on that service to any person or entity other than the addressee or intended recipient of 
such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient.‖). 
 77. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511 2(a)(ii)(A)–(B). 
 78. Steven M. Bellovin biography (Feb. 15, 2008), http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb 
/informal-bio.html. 
 79. Steven M. Bellovin Blog, SMBlog for July 7, 2007, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb 
/blog/2007-07/2007-07-07.html [hereinafter Bellovin Blog]. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). 
 83. Bellovin Blog, supra note 79. 
 84. Id. 
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opposed to Internet routing information.
85
 These differences include the 
public‘s lack of awareness that ISPs actually record their routing 
information and the fact that some individuals don‘t use ISP‘s or other 
corporations to route information through the Internet. 
 
 VI.  ARE INTERNET IP ADDRESSES AND EMAIL TO AND FROM 
ADDRESSES COMMUNICATIVE CONTENT?  
 
The Court in Katz found that it was against the Fourth Amendment 
for police to seize the contents of a telephone communication.
86
 This has 
also been applied to the contents of Internet communication. For 
example, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3121 limits the information that a government 
agency may acquire through a pen register to ―dialing, routing, 
addressing, and signaling information‖ and forbids obtaining the contents 
of any wire or electronic communication.
87
 The Court in United States v. 
Maxwell, explicitly ruled that there is an expectation of privacy in the 
contents of emails stored by ISPs and that the government cannot access 
the contents of these emails without first receiving a warrant.
88
 The Court 
in United States v. Forrester stated that ―pen registers do not acquire the 
contents of communications‖ and that the information the pen registers 
do pick up (routing information such as Internet IP addresses and email 
to and from addresses) are not content.
89
 The Forrester Court also said 
that email to and from addresses and IP addresses are indistinguishable 
from addresses on physical mail.
90
 
However, unlike telephone numbers and addresses, the IP addresses 
and email to and from addresses obtained by an Internet pen register may 
contain information that suggests content. The Court in Smith v. 
Maryland stated that pen registers installed on telephones do not convey 
 
 85. In cases regarding the Internet, the judiciary has very little precedent or statutory law to 
apply. The Internet presents a whole new area of law where ―the terrain is unsettled‖ and ―[t]he 
scholarly field studying these topics is still emerging.‖ John Palfrey, Berkman Center at Harvard 
Law School, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/palfrey/2007/04/23/ (go to ―Key Themes of Internet, Law 
and Politics 2007‖) (last visited January 21, 2008). Additionally, the inherent differences between 
the Internet and other communication devices make it difficult for the court to faithfully analogize to 
precedent. 
 86. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 87. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3121(c) (2001) (―A government agency authorized to install and use a pen 
register or trap and trace device . . . shall use technology reasonably available to it that restricts the 
recording or decoding of electronic or other impulses to the dialing, routing, addressing, and 
signaling information utilized in the processing and transmitting of wire or electronic 
communications so as not to include the contents of any wire or electronic communications.‖). 
 88. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (1996); see also Warshak v. United States, 490 
F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 89. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509–10 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 90. Id. at 511. 
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content because they ―. . . disclose only the telephone numbers that have 
been dialed—a means of establishing communication. Neither the 
purport of any communication between the caller and the recipient of the 
call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is disclosed 
by pen registers.‖91 Thus, a typical telephone pen register generally does 
not reveal content. The types of pen registers used on ISP‘s, however, 
have the potential of revealing much more content than a typical 
telephone pen register. 
Internet routing information is distinguishable from telephone 
numbers and mailing addresses because it is more likely to reveal 
content. In response to the increased government discretion regarding 
Internet routing information that the US Patriot Act gives, the EPIC 
states the following: 
 
The fact that the provision prohibits the capture of ‗content‘ does not 
adequately take into account the unique nature of information captured 
electronically, which contains data far more revealing than phone 
numbers, such as URLs generated while using the Web (which often 
contain a great deal of information that cannot in any way be 
analogized to a telephone number).
92
 
 
 In In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing use of A Pen 
Register and Trap on (XXX) Internet Service Account/User Name, 
(xxxxxxxx@xxx.com) (Pen Register Application), the Court responds to 
an application by the U.S. government to obtain the Court‘s permission 
to use a pen register to monitor the Internet activity of four Internet 
service accounts.
93
 The Court gives a brief history of pen registers, 
writing that pen registers were typically used in telephone 
communications and have only recently been used to obtain Internet 
routing information.
94
 The Court explained that the use of pen registers 
to track telephone communications are usually legal because they are 
unable to track the contents of telephone conversations; however, using 
pen registers to track Internet communications creates greater 
problems.
95
 The Court listed a few potential situations where pen 
registers, if not limited by the ISP, could record the contents
96
 of these 
 
 91. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (quoting United States v. New York Tel. 
Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)). 
 92. EPIC, supra note 16. 
 93. 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 46 (D.Mass. 2005). 
 94. A traditional ―pen register‖ only records telephone numbers. The court in this case also 
refers to ―mirror ports.‖ 
 95. Pen Register Application, 396 F.Supp.2d 45, 47–48 (D. Mass. 2005). 
 96. ―Contents,‖ under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), include ―. . .any information concerning the 
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communications.
97
 Email ―subject lines‖ could be obtained through the 
use of Internet pen registers, which would reveal the contents of the 
communications.
98
 Problems would also arise if the user had put a search 
term into Google or another search engine.
99
 The URL derived from the 
IP address would contain the search words the individual used.
100
 This 
would certainly alert the Government to the ―content‖ that the user was 
seeking.
101
 The Court also commented that IP addresses themselves 
would allow the government to determine the home page of the website 
that the user under surveillance was accessing.
102
 
The Court in Forrester acknowledged that the home page of a 
website could be accessed simply by using the IP address.
103
 However, 
the Court reasoned, the information derived from the IP address is 
different from that of a URL.
104
 A URL would allow a user to find the 
very webpage that the user under surveillance had accessed, whereas, the 
IP address would only allow the government to view the home page of 
the website and not the actual page the user was viewing. The Court used 
the example of the New York Times website. A URL would take you to 
a particular article while the IP address would only take you to 
www.nytimes.com, the company‘s home page.105 
However, despite the fact that access to only a home page tends to 
reduce the ability of the government to access the specific content that 
the user under surveillance accessed, viewing the home page would still 
suggest that content. The general content of most web pages can be 
suggested by viewing the home page. Viewing the home page of a site 
that teaches someone how to cook French food would suggest that the 
user wanted to get some French recipes. The home page of a site on how 
to chemically manufacture ecstasy would imply that the individual was 
seeking to make it himself. Allowing IP addresses like these into 
evidence would implicate guilt for anyone, even individuals who may 
have stumbled across sites like these inadvertently. 
This suggestive content does not have the benign quality of typical 
routing information like telephone numbers and mailing addresses. 
 
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.‖ 
 97. Pen Register Application, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 48–49. 
 98. Id. at 48. 
 99. Id. at 49. 
 100. Id. at 49. 
 101. Id. at 49. 
 102. Id. at 48. IP addresses, if typed into the web address bar, take a user to the home page of 
the website that the user under surveillance was accessing. 
 103. United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1049 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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Phone numbers and mailing addresses do not suggest the content of the 
message. Instead, the information is directive in nature. Even if the 
government agent intercepting this routing information were to discover 
the communication‘s destination, this would reveal location and not 
content. The Internet is unique in that the very form of its routing 
information not only reveals location but, in some instances, reveals 
content. It allows users to deliver and receive content from a specific 
location but that location is typically labeled with a director or word that 
describes the content of the site. While limiting the director to the home 
pages restricts the government‘s ability to see exactly what the user was 
viewing, it doesn‘t eliminate the problem that a home page typically 
infers the type of content viewed by the user. 
While this is most typically true with IP addresses, it can also occur 
with email to and from addresses. Many times the local part of the 
address or the domain name can reveal the nature of the contents of the 
email. For instance, the email address for the admissions department at 
Montana State University is admissions@montana.edu.
106
 An agent 
reading this information recovered by a pen register could infer that this 
communication involved a question involving admissions to Montana 
University. 
The Court in Pen Register Application stated that because IP 
addresses are susceptible to revealing content, the court order to place a 
pen register on a specific user account needs to limit the types of 
information that an ISP can release to the government during 
surveillance.
107
 In Forrester, the defense counsel made a motion to 
discover the information obtained by the government with the pen 
register on Alba‘s user account. The defense lawyer wanted the 
application in order to see if the order had included restricting 
instructions of the type required by the Court in Pen Register 
Application. He requested the application because, according to his 
expert—Marcus Lawson, a computer specialist and a former U.S. 
Customs Special Agent—―. . . the intrusion on the computer traffic of 
Mr. Alba was extensive‖ and suggested that Mr. Alba‘s ISP used the pen 
register to obtain the content of Mr. Alba‘s Internet communications in 
addition to routing information.
108
 The Court in Forrester did not go into 
a discussion about the precise types of information gathered by the pen 
register, which, according to Lawson, may have included content. 
 
 106. Montana State University information request page (Mar. 6, 2008), 
http://www.montana.edu/wwwnss/need_info.shtml. 
 107. 396 F. Supp. 2d at 48–49. 
 108. United States v. Alba, 2006 WL 2967374, 11 (Mar. 8, 2006) (Brief for the Appellant). 
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IP addresses and email to and from addresses are atypical because 
rather than simply direct the reader to where the content is to be sent, 
received, or viewed, they suggest the content of the communications 
themselves. This is why the courts need to be cautious when analogizing 
between typical routing information, like telephone numbers and mailing 
addresses, and Internet routing information. Courts need to also be 
cautious to include instructions limiting the amount of information to be 
obtained from an ISP with a pen register as pen registers have the 
capacity of revealing email subject lines and search terms. 
 
 VII.  CONCLUSION  
 
The Court concluded their opinion in Forrester by stating that even 
if the evidence obtained through the pen registers should have been 
suppressed it would be a harmless error not to suppress. The Court 
explained: 
 
The evidence obtained through the computer surveillance was never 
introduced at trial and was used only as a minor portion of the 
government‘s application for a court order authorizing imaging and 
keystroke monitoring. There was more than enough other evidence in 
that application to generate probable cause even if the to/from 
addresses of Alba‘s emails, the IP addresses he accessed and the 
volume of data transmitted to or from his account had been suppressed. 
The discussion of the computer surveillance . . . revealed only that Alba 
had sent emails to Forrester and accessed certain chemical websites.
109
 
 
The results from the pen register, as well as the large amounts of 
other evidence, made it clear that Alba and Forrester were guilty of 
planning the ecstasy manufacturing operation. The Court‘s analysis in 
this case clearly produced a just result. However, their reasoning may 
endanger other defendants whose guilt is less apparent. The Court‘s 
failure to recognize the inherent differences between telephone and 
Internet communications may affect the ability of later courts to give 
such defendants a just result. 
The Court failed to acknowledge that most members of the public do 
not consider giving private information to a corporate entity an invitation 
to offer that information to the public or government officials. It also 
failed to realize that although Smith found telephone numbers to have no 
expectation of privacy, many individuals may have a higher expectation 
 
 109. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 513 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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of privacy for information given electronically through ISPs than 
telephone companies who record those numbers in a monthly bill. 
Additionally, the Court failed to recognize that IP and email 
addresses may be more suggestive of the content of the communication 
than a telephone number. Telephone numbers do not contain information 
such as the identity of the callers, the purport of the communication, nor 
whether the call was even completed.
110
 In contrast Internet 
communications received through a pen register may more specifically 
identify the person who is making the communication, and may, if not 
checked, reveal such information as email subject lines, home pages, and 
search terms. 
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